Abstract. A protocol compiler is described, that transforms any provably secure authenticated 2-party key establishment into a provably secure authenticated group key establishment with 2 more rounds of communication. The compiler introduces neither idealizing assumptions nor high-entropy secrets, e. g., for signing. In particular, applying the compiler to a password-authenticated 2-party key establishment without random oracle assumption, yields a password-authenticated group key establishment without random oracle assumption. Our main technical tools are non-interactive and non-malleable commitment schemes that can be implemented in the common reference string (CRS) model.
Introduction
During the last decades, the design of 2-party key establishments has been explored intensively. Certainly not all relevant issues are covered by the available theoretical models, but the techniques at hand proved to be a valuable foundation for the design of practical protocols. On the other hand, the design of group key establishments with n > 2 participants is much less understood, and there is a need for significant theoretical progress. In particular for passwordauthenticated protocols the situation is not very satisfying. A number of protocols have been designed for such a setting, including [24, 1, 2, 28, 13] , but it seems to be a non-trivial task to establish strong provable security guarantees without making idealized assumptions.
One valuable tool for breaking down the task of designing a group key establishment protocol into conceptually simpler steps are protocol compilers that build on the security of a given 2-party solution: It seems a plausible design approach to start with a 2-party key establishment and then to apply an efficient compiler which derives the desired n-party solution. Indeed, a number of such generic constructions have been discussed in the literature, including [9, 25, 17] . Remarkably, all proposed constructions rely, to the best of our knowledge, on the use of high-entropy secrets for achieving security against active adversaries. In particular, for the case of password-based authentication in the standard model, no generic 2-to-n compiler seems to be known. The only result in this direction we are aware of is a construction of Abdalla et al. [1, 2] to extend a 2-party solution to the 3-party case.
Our contribution. We describe a compiler that enables the derivation of an authenticated group key establishment protocol from an arbitrary authenticated 2-party key establishment (AKE). In particular, for a password-authenticated 2-party key establishment (PAKE) we obtain a password-authenticated group key establishment. Our compiler does not impose idealizing assumptions or highentropy secrets for authentication. The suggested construction builds on the use of non-interactive and non-malleable commitments, which in the Common Reference String (CRS) model are known to be implementable through IND-CCA2 secure encryption schemes. For the security proof, we build on a model adapted from [18, 20, 6] which in turn builds on [4, 3] . The structure of our compiler is inspired by the constant-round protocol recently proposed by Bohli et al. [6] which in turn builds on [8, 14, 15] . If the underlying 2-party protocol requires r rounds of communication, the group key establishment output by the compiler takes r + 2 rounds.
Organization of the paper. In the next section we recall the basic components of the security framework. We also address some specifics of password-based authentication, a scenario where the application of our protocol compiler seems particularly attractive. Thereafter, we detail the suggested protocol compiler and present the respective security proof. Section 4 indicates some possible applications of our compiler.
Security Model and Security Goals
For our compiler, we assume the availability of a common reference string (CRS) which, similarly as in [14, 6] , encodes i) the necessary information for implementing a non-interactive and non-malleable commitment scheme, ii) a uniformly at random chosen element from a family of universal hash functions and iii) two values v 0 , v 1 that will serve as arguments for a pseudorandom function when computing the session identifier and session key.
The total set of users will be denoted by P and is assumed to be of polynomial size. By U = {U 1 , . . . , U n } ⊆ P we denote the set of protocol participants. We assume that shared (low-or high-entropy) secrets needed for authentication are generated in a trusted initialization phase. During this trusted initialization phase, also possibly needed public keys may be distributed to all potential protocol participants. If authentication is based on shared secrets, we may either assume that each pair of protocol participants U i , U j ∈ U shares such a secret or that the complete set of protocol participants U shares one common secret (our compiler is provably secure in either case). We assume that all secrets are chosen independently.
Specifics for password-based authentication. In the case of password-authenticated key establishment, we assume a dictionary D ⊆ {0, 1}
* to be publicly available. It is supposed to be efficiently recognizable and of constant or polynomial size. In particular, a polynomially bounded adversary is able to exhaust the complete dictionary D. We assume that all passwords are chosen independently and uniformly at random from D.
Communication Model and Adversarial Capabilities
As mentioned earlier, our security model is essentially adopted from [6] which in turn builds on [8, 14, 15, 5] . Moreover, as we consider forward secrecy, we also include a Corrupt-oracle. As usual, users are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) Turing machines. For our proofs, we may either use uniform or nonuniform Turing machines.
Protocol instances. Each protocol participant U ∈ U may execute a polynomial number of protocol instances in parallel. A single instance Π si i can be interpreted as a process executed by protocol participant U i . Throughout, the notation Π si i (i ∈ N) will be used to refer to instance s i of protocol participant U i ∈ U. To each instance we assign seven variables: used si i indicates whether this instance is or has been used for a protocol run. The used si i flag can only be set through a protocol message received by the instance due to a call to the Execute-or to the Send-oracle (see below); state si i keeps the state information needed during the protocol execution; term si i shows if the execution has terminated; sid si i denotes a public session identifier that can serve as identifier for the session key sk si i . Note that even though we do not construct session identifiers as session transcripts, the adversary is allowed to learn all session identifiers; pid For more details on the usage of the variables we refer to the work of Bellare et al. in [3] .
Communication network. We assume arbitrary point-to-point connections among users to be available. The network is non-private and fully asynchronous: The adversary may delay, eavesdrop, insert and delete messages at will.
Adversarial capabilities. We consider ppt adversaries only. Let b be a bit chosen uniformly at random. The capabilities of an adversary A are made explicit through a number of oracles allowing A to communicate with protocol instances run by the users: 
Corrupt(U i
. This returns all long-term secrets of user U i . In case of passwordbased authentication, all passwords held by U i are returned. In the case of U i having long-term private keys, e. g., for signing, these private keys are returned.
Remark 1. The model described above seems apparently stronger than those normally used elsewhere since it allows for multiple Test queries. Nevertheless, one can easily show the two notions to be equivalent via a standard hybrid argument with a loss of a factor q in the reduction, with q being the total number of protocol instances. A similar model was also considered by Abdalla et al. in [2] to prove the security of their password-authenticated 3-party key establishment. Fortunately, as pointed out in [2] , the loss of a factor q in the reduction can be avoided in most cases as several of the existing schemes (e.g., [19, 20, 15] ) already meet this apparently stronger notion of security. This is due to the fact that, in their security proofs, they show that all fresh session keys that can be tested by the adversary are indistinguishable from random.
Correctness, Integrity and Secrecy
Before we define correctness, integrity and secrecy, we introduce partnering to express which instances are associated in a common protocol session.
Partnering. We refer to instances Π To avoid trivial cases, we assume that an instance Π si i always accepts the session key constructed at the end of the corresponding protocol run if no deviation from the protocol specification has occurred. Moreover, we want that all users in the same protocol session come up with the same session key, and we capture this in the subsequent notion of correctness.
Correctness. We call a group key establishment protocol P correct, if in the presence of a passive adversary A-i. e., A must neither use the Send nor the Corrupt oracle-the following holds: for all i, j with both sid Key integrity. By definition, correctness takes only passive attacks into account. In contrast, key integrity imposes no restrictions on the adversary's oracle access: We say that a correct group key establishment protocol fulfills key integrity, if with overwhelming probability all instances of users that have accepted with the same session identifier sid sj j hold identical session keys sk sj j and identical partner identifiers pid sj j . Next, for detailing the security definition, we will have to specify under which conditions a Test-query may be executed.
Freshness.
A Test-query should only be allowed to those instances holding a key that is not for trivial reasons known to the adversary. To this aim, an instance Π The idea of this definition is that revealing a session key from an instance Π si i trivially yields the session key of all instances partnered with Π si i , and hence this kind of "attack" will be excluded in the security definition.
Security/key secrecy. For a secure group key establishment protocol, we have to impose a corresponding bound on the adversary's advantage: The advantage Adv A ( ) of a ppt adversary A in attacking protocol P is a function in the security parameter , defined as
Here Succ is the probability that the adversary queries Test only on fresh instances and guesses correctly the bit b used by the Test oracle (without violating the freshness of those instances queried with Test) :
In the case of password-authenticated key establishment, due to the polynomial size of the dictionary D, we cannot prevent an adversary from correctly guessing shared passwords with non-negligible probability. Thus, for the password-authenticated setting, our goal is to restrict the adversary A to onlineverification of password guesses, namely, to prove that Adv A is only negligibly above the probability A has guessed a shared password online. We introduce a function ε to capture such weaknesses that originate in the employed authentication technique. For the password case, ε should bound A's probability of guessing a shared password, assuming he is not able to test (online) more than a constant number of passwords per protocol instance.
Remark 2.
Following the spirit of [14, 6] , it would be desirable to restrict the number of passwords that can be guessed online to one per protocol instance. As described, our compiler accesses the underlying authenticated 2-party key establishment as a black-box only, and our security proof does not guarantee that only one password can be verified per instance. For specific instances a tighter security reduction may be possible, however.
Definition 1. We say that an authenticated group key establishment protocol P is ε-secure, if for every ppt adversary A the following inequality holds for some negligible function negl:
where is the security parameter and q send is the number of different protocol instances A queries the Send oracle with. The function ε is expected to be at most linear in its second variable, i.e. the number of Send queries.
Forward Secrecy. We follow the spirit of the definition of forward secrecy from [19] , yet our definition is weaker: we consider the "weak corruption model" of [3] in which corrupting a principal means only retrieving his long term secret keys. Forward secrecy is then achieved if such corruption does not give the adversary any information about previously agreed session keys. This same approach has also been taken in [7, 16] .
Remark 3. Note that our definition of freshness allows for Test queries to instances such that their (or their partners') long term secret keys have been revealed to the adversary by a Corrupt query as long as no Send query has been asked to any of these instances (or their partners) after the Corrupt query. Thus, the above definition of ε-security implies forward secrecy in this sense.
From Two to Group: A Compiler
In this section, we describe how an n-party AKE can be derived from any 2-party AKE carrying over its essential security properties. Our compiler assumes the availability of a 2-party key establishment that is ε-secure in the sense of Definition 1, where ε is defined according to the authentication method used. Our construction then yields anε-secure n-party AKE whereε is bounded by 4·ε.
Tools
For the actual compiler, black-box access to the authenticated 2-party key establishment suffices, and Fig. 1 captures this access with an oracle 2-AKE(·, ·) that upon input of two principals U i , U j ∈ P (or rather their identities), returns the respective output of the 2-party protocol. We assume this output to be either a secret key κ ∈ {0, 1} k or a special symbol indicating that the key establishment failed (due to adversarial interference). Additionally, the tools involved in our construction are:
-a non-interactive non-malleable commitment scheme [12] C, fulfilling the following requirements: 1. it must be perfectly binding, i. e., every commitment c defines at most one value decommit(c); 2. it must achieve non-malleability for multiple commitments-if an adversary receives commitments to a (polynomial sized) set of values ν he must not be able to output commitments to a (polynomial sized) set of values β related to ν in a known way. Note that in the CRS model with a common reference string ρ, the above commitment schemes C = C ρ can be constructed from any public key encryption scheme that is non-malleable and secure for multiple encryptions (in particular, from any IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme).
-a collision-resistant pseudorandom function family F = {F } ∈N as used by Katz and Shin [21] . We assume F = {F η } η∈{0,1} L to be indexed by a superpolynomial sized set {0, 1} L and denote by v 0 = v 0 ( ) a publicly known value such no ppt adversary can find two different indices
For deriving the session key we use another public value v 1 which fulfills the above collision-resistance condition as well and is also encoded in the CRS (see [21] for more details).
-a family of universal hash functions UH that maps the concatenation of bitstrings from {0, 1} kn and a partner pid
The CRS selects one universal hash function UH from this family. We use UH to select an index within the aforementioned collision-resistant pseudorandom function family.
Design Rationale
The idea of our compiler is inspired in the classical construction of Burmester and Desmedt [8] , where the trick of constructing a group key from pairwise agreed keys among the group principals was first introduced. Further, our construction in some sense generalizes the design of [6] , that builds an n-party PAKE on Gennaro and Lindell's 2-party PAKE. Once the pairwise key establishments have been completed, each principal must commit to the XOR-value of the two keys he shares with his neighbors. This value is disclosed in a subsequent round, allowing all principals to derive each of the 2-party keys, from which both the session identifier and the session key will be derived. Intuitively, if an adversary has not been able to pervert the security of any of the 2-party protocol executions involved, neither will he be able to retrieve any information about the resulting group session key (for XORs of "randomly looking" elements should look as well random to him). Moreover, integrity is also provided by an argument similar to the one in [6] .
The compiler does not rely on further authentication techniques than those used in the basic 2-party AKE protocol, neither on any further idealization assumption. Also, our design is symmetric in the sense that all users perform the same steps. Fig. 1 shows the three rounds of our construction, adding 2 rounds to those of the underlying 2-party AKE. For the sake of readability, we do not explicitly refer to instances s i of users. Also, we omit the pid si i -values, assuming that when the protocol is initiated (via a Send or Execute call) each participant involved receives a message informing him of the actual pid of the session, which in addition makes him aware of his position in the "cycle" of involved principals and therefore the 2-AKE step (Round 0) can be performed accordingly.
Remark 4.
The compiler can be applied to any polynomial number of participants n ≥ 2. The case n = 2 is not excluded, but to some extent pathological: Here the compiler executes the underlying 2-party AKE twice, so that each party obtains two independent keys − → K i , ← − K i , which are then combined to form the actual session key.
Security Analysis
Assume that we are given a correct and secure authenticated 2-party key establishment protocol. Assume further that C is a non-interactive non-malleable commitment scheme and F a collision-resistant pseudorandom function family. In the following, we show that under these assumptions the compiler in Fig. 1 yields a correct and secure group key establishment. In particular, this is true when the underlying 2-party AKE protocol is based on passwords. Fig. 1 is a correct and 4 · ε-secure authenticated group key establishment protocol, which also provides key integrity.
Theorem 1. Let F be a family of secure collision-resistant pseudorandom functions, let C be a non-interactive perfectly binding non-malleable commitment scheme, and let 2-AKE be a correct and ε-secure authenticated 2-party key establishment protocol. Then the protocol in
Proof. Correctness. In an honest execution of the protocol, it is easy to verify that all participants in the protocol will terminate by accepting and computing the same session identifier and session key.
Integrity. Owing to the collision-resistance of the family F , all oracles that accept with identical session identifiers use with overwhelming probability the same 
and chooses a random ri to compute a commitment Ci = Cρ(i, Xi; ri). Broadcast: Each Ui broadcasts M 
defines a master key
and sets ski := F UH(K) (v1), sidi := F UH(K) (v0) and acci := true.
a All indices are to be taken in a cycle, i. e., Un+1 = U1, etc.
Fig. 1. A protocol compiler
index value UH(K) and therewith also derive the same session key and have identical partner identifiers.
Key secrecy. The proof of key secrecy will proceed in a sequence of games, starting with the real attack against the key secrecy of the group key exchange protocol and ending in a game in which the adversary's advantage is 0, and for which we can bound the difference in the adversary's advantage between any two consecutive games. Following standard notation, we denote by Adv(A, G i ) the advantage of the adversary A in Game i. Furthermore, for clarity, we classify the Send queries into 3 categories, depending on the stage of the protocol to which the query is associated, starting with Send-0 and ending with Send-2. Send-t denotes the Send query associated with round t for t = 0, 1, 2.
Game 0. This first game corresponds to a real attack, in which all the parameters, such as the public parameters in the common reference string and the long-term secrets associated with each user, are chosen as in the actual scheme. By definition, Adv(A, G 0 ) = Adv(A). Note that the distance between this game and the previous one is bounded by the probability that the adversary breaks the security of any of the underlying 2-AKE protocols. More precisely, we have
where q send represents the number of different protocol instances in Send queries. The factor 2 multiplying q send emerges because one instance in the group key protocol builds on two instances of the 2-AKE protocol for the key establishment with the right and left neighbor, respectively. The other factor 2 is due to the security definition which states that the advantage of an adversary is twice its success probability minus 1.
To prove this, we show how an adversary A 2-AKE is constructed from a given adversary A distinguishing Game G 1 from Game G 0 .
A 2-AKE is given access to a simulation of the 2-AKE protocol as outlined in Section 2. To answer its queries, A 2-AKE will associate each user instance Π si i in the group protocol with two independent instances of the same user in the 2-AKE protocol. Now, whenever A makes a Corrupt query, A 2-AKE answers it by querying the Corrupt oracle of the 2-AKE protocol and returns the same answer. To answer an Execute query, A 2-AKE first queries the Execute oracle of the 2-AKE protocol with the corresponding instances to obtain the transcript for Round 0. To simulate the following rounds, A 2-AKE first queries the Test oracle of the 2-AKE protocol with the corresponding instances and uses the returned values as the keys ← − K i and − → K i . To answer a Send-0 query, A 2-AKE queries the Send oracle of the 2-AKE protocol with the corresponding instance and returns its response. To answer Send queries pertaining rounds 1 and 2, A 2-AKE first sets the values of the keys ← − K i and − → K i by querying either the Test or Reveal oracle of the 2-AKE protocol with the corresponding instances and proceeds with the simulation as in the previous game. More precisely, if an instance Π si i in the group protocol is still considered fresh at the beginning of Round 1, then A 2-AKE queries the Test oracle of the 2-AKE protocol with the corresponding instances in the 2-AKE protocol. Otherwise, A 2-AKE queries the Reveal oracle.
Finally, one can easily see that the view of A corresponds to Game G 0 if Test reveals the actually exchanged key and to Game G 1 if Test returns a random element from the key space. Thus, A succeeds distinguishing Game G 0 and Game G 1 with a probability of at most Adv 2-AKE ( , 2 · q send ).
Game 2.
In this game, we change the simulation of the Send oracle so that a fresh instance Π si i does not accept in Round 2 whenever one commitment C j for j = i it receives in Round 1 was generated by the simulator but not generated by the are partnered through an execution of the underlying 2-party key establishment (i. e., they hold a common 2-party session key − → K αμ = ← − K αμ+1 associated with the same session identifier and the same two protocol participants).
The adversary A can detect the difference to Game G 1 if A replayed a commitment that should have led to acceptance in Round 2 in that game. Because the committed value X i is a random value independent of previous messages, the probability for this is negligible.
To see why, note that given one session, an instance Π si i expects commitments
will only accept with negligible probability if all commitments where generated by the simulator, however, not being exactly the commitments C j , j = i by the respective oracles Π sj j , j = i of the session. This can be seen as follows: The equation
Because the commitment C j includes the index of user U j and is perfectly binding, the adversary A cannot reveal the commitments if they are permuted within the participants of the session. As by now all keys are random values, the probability for any XOR sum of keys not consisting exactly of the keys in one session (thus canceling each other w.r.t. XOR) to be 0 is only 1/2 k . The adversary A is at maximum capable of doing this q send times, giving him a probability q send /2 k of distinguishing the games.
Game 3. This game reproduces the modification also for adversary-generated commitments: The simulation of the Send oracle changes so that a fresh instance Π si i does not accept in Round 2 whenever one commitment C j for j = i it receives in Round 1 was adversary-generated. The adversary's advantage diverges only negligibly from the previous game:
To prove this, we construct a malleability attacker A COM to the commitment scheme from an adversary A that comes up with a commitment C j to Π si i such that Π si i would accept in Game G 2 but not in Game G 3 . Our goal is to show that the probability with which A COM succeeds in outputting a related vector of commitments is related to the probability with which A can distinguish Games
A COM is given commitments C i = C ρ (i, X i ; r i ) for i = 1, . . . , n where the X i values are random bitstrings fulfilling X 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ X n = 0. For bitstrings X i , i = 1, . . . , n, the 2n-ary relation is given by   R(X 1 , . . . , X n , X 1 , . . . , X n ) = 1 if and only if
A COM starts by guessing the first instance Π si i to receive from A a set of commitments C j , for j = i, with at least one of these commitments being adversarygenerated. For all sessions other than the one in which Π si i is involved, A COM simulate the oracles exactly as it would in Game G 2 . For the session in which Π si i is involved, A COM uses the C i values that it has received as input to answer Send-1 queries. Then, as soon as A provides Π si i with a set of commitments C j for j = i, then A COM halts the simulation and outputs this set along with C i .
One can easily see that A COM will succeed in outputting a set of related commitments satisfying the relation R if it guesses correctly the first instance to receive a set of commitments containing at least one adversary-generated commitment and passing the verification test. This is true because games G 3 and G 2 are indistinguishable up to that point and the simulation of the oracles by A COM is perfect.
By definition of non-malleability, the success probability of A COM is only negligibly greater than that of an adversary who does not see the list of commitments C i for i = 1, . . . , n. If no commitments are given, an adversary's probability to send valid commitments C j for j = i such that
k as in the previous game. As a result, the non-malleability of the commitment scheme guarantees that the adversary's success probability with access to these commitments is negligibly close to q send /2 k , thus, being negligible in total.
Game 4. Now the simulation of the Execute and Send oracles are modified at the point of computing the session key. The simulator keeps a list of assignments
Once an instance receives the last Send-2 query, the simulator computes K 1 , . . . , K n and checks if for this sequence a master key was already issued and assigns this key to the instance. If no such entry exists in the list, the simulator chooses a session key sk si i ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. The master key K = (K 1 , . . . , K n , pid si i ) has, once the X i are public, sufficient entropy such that the output of the pseudorandom function F UH(K) is distinguishable from a random sk si i with negligible probability only.
In Game G 4 , all session keys are chosen uniformly at random and the adversary has no advantage.
Adv(A, G 4 ) = 0.
Applications and Comments
The above compiler allows for the construction of very efficient authenticated group key exchange protocols adding up to the "base" 2-AKE only two rounds of communication. As we have remarked, our compiler adds neither any authentication tool nor any additional idealization assumptions to the base scheme.
Example 1. Applying our compiler to a password-authenticated 2-party key establishment offering forward secrecy, we immediately obtain a forward secure password-authenticated group key establishment. It should be pointed out here, however, that stronger notions of forward secrecy than ours can be considered [19] . Actually, it is an interesting question to explore whether the KOY 2-AKE from [19] (or variants of it) can be proven secure in our model-therewith yielding through application of our compiler the first forward secure passwordauthenticated group key establishment.
Of course, our compiler can also be applied in the random oracle model-in practice this means to replace the "full-fledged" commitment scheme and the family of collision resistant pseudorandom functions through the (more efficient) use of a cryptographic hash function (cf. [21] ). Going one step further, from an engineering perspective it is tempting to apply the compiler to an efficient authenticated 2-party key establishment, even if no security proof in the above model is available. Of course, in this case our security analysis does not yield a provable security statement on the resulting group key establishment.
Example 2.
A natural starting point for applying our compiler would be the (H)MQV family discussed in [27, 23, 26, 22] . The resulting scheme could be rather efficient in practice, but the available formal security analysis builds on a model due to Canetti and Krawczyk [11] . We have not attempted to carry out a security analysis in the model underlying the above discussion and consequently cannot claim provable security guarantees of a derived group key establishment.
Conclusions
The compiler we presented allows the construction of authenticated group key establishment schemes based on any provably secure authenticated 2-party key establishment. At this forward secrecy is taken into account, and the suggested compiler does not introduce new idealizing assumptions or tools for authentication, like an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. In terms of efficiency, adding only two additional rounds to a 2-party solution seems acceptable, too, and renders the compiler an interesting tool for practical protocol design. Both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view, it seems worthwhile to explore the tightness of the above security proof more closely, when applying the compiler to specific protocols. In the described form, the compiler restricts to black-box access to the underlying two-party key establishment, but for a specific use case, there is no need for such a restriction. Also, we have not explored the behaviour of our compiler within the universal composability framework. In particular, it would be interesting to explore the security level achieved applying our compiler to universally composable password based two party key exchange protocols, along the lines of [10] .
